Washington: Urging the Bush administration to keep the United States broader security interests in mind, a senior member of a think tank in Washington has recommended that it would be in Washington's interest to keep India rather than Pakistan in good humour.

"America's long-term interests in Asia require a partnership with India, not Pakistan. India is not only the leading power in South Asia, it is a rising great power with a reach beyond that region," says Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defence and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.

In his study titled "Peace and Freedom: Foreign Policy for a Constitutional Republic," Carpenter said, "India can be a stabilising force in the Persian Gulf as well as a strategic counterweight to China. Both of those developments would benefit the United States."

"It is imperative that Washington not jeopardise the embryonic strategic partnership with India," he adds. Calling on the Bush administration to be more sensitive to India's concerns vis-à-vis` Washington's stated rapprochement with Islamabad, Carpenter said though Pakistan's cooperation would be necessary in the short term to disrupt the al-Qaida's remaining infrastructure, care must be taken "not to sacrifice its more important long-term relationship with India."

Fortunately, he said, Bush had declined to approve one item on Musharraf's wish list during his June visit to the US - the delivery of 60 F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan, which would have strengthened its military position against India.

Even without that sale, he claimed that India was nervous about US-Pak ties.

On US relations with Pakistan, Carpenter says the Bush administration needs to realise that Islamabad has not been a consistent and enthusiastic ally in Washington's war against terror.

"Let's remember that Pakistan was the chief political and financial sponsor of the Taleban in Afghanistan from the beginning. Without Islamabad's help, it is unlikely the Taleban would have come to power. And without a Taleban regime in Kabul, Afghanistan never would have become a safe haven for al-Qaida.

Pakistan was, therefore, more than a little responsible for Sept 11," he said.

"Even after that attack, Islamabad turned against the Taleban only in response to intense pressure from the United States. Pakistani forces were ineffectual in sealing the border with Afghanistan when US troops had Taleban and al-Qaida fighters on the run in late 2001, yet the Musharraf government refused to give the United States the right of hot pursuit into Pakistani territory."

As a result, terrorist units regrouped in Pakistan's border provinces and to this day continue to harass US forces in Afghanistan."

"Worse, there were credible reports that rogue elements of Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, helped evacuate Taleban and al-Qaida personnel from Afghanistan. Such behaviour underscores another key point about Pakistan.

Even though the Musharraf government may now be reasonably cooperative with the United States, the country as a whole appears to be drifting toward a radical Islamic orientation."

"The ISI is riddled with radical Islamic sympathisers. Two of the country's provinces are controlled by Islamist political forces and a radical Islamist party leads in the national Parliament."

"The Musharraf government itself continues to play a double game on the terrorism issue. True, the regime has arrested a number of high profile al-Qaida operatives, as well as the suspected killers of journalist Daniel Pearl."

"At the same time, however, Islamabad continues to support terrorist organisations in Kashmir that are allied with al-Qaida. That is hardly the conduct of a reliable ally in the war on terror," Carpenter says.

"Washington must be cautious about subsidising the Musharraf government.

Money is fungible, and funds intended for Pakistan's economic development can easily be siphoned off for other purposes, including aiding allies of al-Qaida," he adds.

"Given the dubious record of the ISI, that is not an irrational concern. Ultimately, Pakistan needs greater will more than it does greater financial resources to confront the forces of terrorism."

"On balance, a three-billion-Dollar aid package seems overly generous. A smaller sum would have been more appropriate to compensate a temporary, and not terribly reliable, ally," he concludes.

ANI