By now, everybody and their dog has added their two cents about the ceasefire and its implications. But, when you start looking at the fair amount of open source information now available about this ceasefire, and start connecting the dots - some startling facts emerge.

Hypothesis 1 – Secret discussions have been going on for a while.

This ceasefire is the result of a fair amount of background discussions between India and Pakistan. How do we know this?

First we have Jethmalani saying: "He said the Kashmir Committee was engaged in "secret and valid work and we are sure we are doing an excellent work". The Committee believes it should do all the diplomatic work "without the press breathing down your neck".

Next, B Raman correctly deduces: "It is not clear whether the Pakistani announcement of an unilateral observance of a cease-fire, despite India's openly-expressed scepticism of past Pakistani proposals in this regard which were not followed up, was the outcome of any scenario carefully worked out between the two countries in secret back- channel talks. Though there is so far no definitive indication of any such secret talks, the rapidity with which the modalities for the cease-fire have been agreed to within 48 hours does give rise to a feeling that the developments were probably the culmination of some secret probings, directly or indirectly through intermediaries".

Then, we have Fernandes talking about a final solution, which was only arrived after serious thought:

"There are enough reasons to believe the ceasefire could take the two countries to a final solution as it was implemented after a serious thought, he told reporters."

Note, the speed with which the following have happened in the last few days: Pakistan offers ceasefire India responds within less than 48 hours agreeing and offering ceasefire on Siachen Within less than a week, Atal offers direct talks between him and Jamali, which is immediately received with “enthusiasm” Musharraf follows up a day later with agreement to remove the over flight ban.

Things, just do not move that fast in international politics, and neither have they, here. Discussions and a roadmap are clearly in place. As I mentioned in my previous article, a near-summit between India and Pakistan is definitely on, for the SAARC confab in January. India will accept full-fledged bilateral talks in Islamabad in January. Who is behind the talks – B. Raman thinks it is Russia, with the appropriate nudges from China – me thinks, the US hand is always present in such issues.

Hypothesis 2 – The Chenab plan as a potential solution is definitely on the table

So, what is the final solution that Fernandes is talking about? It is some negotiation around the Chenab Plan, proposed by the Kashmir Study Group.

It is in this context that the Hurriyat plan must be seen – it is almost exactly the same plan as suggested by the DC group - Kashmir Study group or whatever it is called. This plan is said to have a fair amount of support within the State Department. It has its supporters within the Indian media leaders and perhaps even in the government - especially, amongst people who think that if they compromise on Kashmir, Pakistan will stop using terrorism. US and UK already seem to be “expressing” a lot of interest in the plan, as in: “A new-found interest by Americans and Britishers in the road map of the Hurriet Conference has added a new dimension to the proposed dialogue between the separatist conglomerate and Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani”.

This issue arises, since Fernandes is talking about a final solution – this implies that he knows something about the form of that final solution, otherwise he would not know whether it is final or not. And, we already know what Jamali has been saying: "Mr. Jamali said the main objective of the dialogue would be to achieve a "durable solution" to the Kashmir problem. Speaking at the Rawalpindi Press Club on Friday, he had asserted that ... there was no question of accepting the Line of Control (LoC) as the permanent border".

The only solution that has been presented and is being thrust on India is the Chenab plan. No! - I'm not suggesting that India has accepted the Chenab Plan, but it is certainly being considered and is probably a point to start discussions around. These discussions will be started off during SAARC in January.

India needs to present its own plan and not rely on the Pakistani sponsored Chenab Plan - my recommendation is that Indian organizations such as the Kashmir Group, start with the Neelam Plan (see), as a minimal acceptable position for India, while the Government of India sticks to its “we want all of PoK back” plan.

Hypothesis 3 – Did India just blink?

This question arises – since, terrorism in Kashmir has neither reduced, nor has Pakistan stopped supporting and building up the terrorist infrastructure. So, why did suddenly India agree to these bilateral talks, after insisting for months that “CBT must stop before talks”?

Once again, the information is openly available. Saleem Shehzad seems to have hit the nail on the head. "President General Pervez Musharraf held meetings with jihadi leaders in which he assured them that he supported "jihad in Kashmir" with his "heart and soul". After these assurances, the Jamaatut Dawa (formerly the Lashkar-i-Toiba) was encouraged, with all means and resources, to stage a large gathering in Mureedkey, Punjab, where thousands of jihadis gathered and vowed to liberate Kashmir. Maulana Masood Azhar of the Khuddamul Islam (effectively the Jaish-i-Mohammed) was also invited to address the gathering.

Before that gathering, Azhar paid frequent visits to the port city of Karachi to revive 32 units out of about 148 that had existed until the Jaish-i-Mohammed was banned. Before the last visit, a big publicity campaign started, with about Rs 50,000 (US$870) paid for wall posters alone. Subsequently, Azhar attracted about 7,000 people to north Karachi's famous Batha mosque. Azhar was visibly protected by local police.

At this point, a big operation in Kashmir appeared imminent in which it was hoped to force the Indian leadership to resume dialogue on the disputed territory on Pakistan's terms. Delhi, however, responded by applying all its good offices with Washington."

A huge terrorist attack right before the 2004 elections would certainly affect the LokSabha elections - and our PM may well have considered all the pros and cons, before agreeing. What I hope is that, we have not blinked on anything more than just the timing of the talks, since the Chenab plan or any variation of it, presents a disastrous threat to India’s water supply. So, yes – India just blinked.

Hypotheses 4: Pakistan pressured into this – kinda/sorta

There really are 5 different reasons for Pakistan agreeing to this:

Post November is not the time to infiltrate - snow blocks the passes

Pakistan is changing its point of entry into India ...

"Pakistan committed itself to a change in its mode of operations. Traditionally, jihadis have penetrated into Indian territory from Kashmir, but now the "launching" apparatus has been moved to Karachi for militants to cross the border from Sindh province into India, from where they will either make their way to Kashmir or seek out soft targets in India". In As B. Raman tells us: "Pakistan already has a sufficient number of trained and armed infiltrators inside J & K. to keep the proxy war going for at least 12 to 18 months despite the cease-fire and without the need for large-scale fresh infiltrations…. Even after allowing for a certain percentage of errors of over-estimation, it is assessed that least 2,000 well-motivated, trained and armed Pakistani jihadi terrorists are available for Islamabad inside J&K to keep its proxy war going".

Pakistani perfidy is becoming difficult to hide, and the west believes that if Pakistan is given a part of Indian Kashmir, it will overnight turn into a country that is “good as gold”. Headlines in the last two days have read:
“Taliban leader Mullah Omar spotted in Pakistan city”
“Pakistani intelligence agency ISI has equipped Taliban fighters with 700 motorbikes, weapons and satellite phones to fight the Americans”
“Pakistani jehadis are streaming into Iraq to fight American occupation troops, say Government sources. This is a consequence of the Al-Qaeda having taken up the war against the US in Iraq as its current 'big project', they say”. So, the Pakistanis are helping kill Americans in both Afghanistan and Iraq – what’s new here.

Pakistan has suffered back-to-back reverses in international diplomacy. First China was extremely harsh to Musharraf for the support provided by Pakistan to Uighir rebels. Next, many capitals have now begun to suspect Musharraf's intent, according to Musharraf’s recent press conference. Musharraf knows that it is time to negotiate - he can get limited Taliban control over Afghanistan and some concessions on Kashmir, without having to give up either terrorism as a national culture or his job.

So, yes Pakistan is under some pressure, but this time Pakistan is proving to be the better negotiator and has managed not to give up anything that it considers strategic; on the contrary, it stands to make significant advances in both Kashmir and Afghanistan.

Hypotheses 5: India has made significant strategic concessions with this ceasefire

The short answer is Yes. Here’s what India gives up.
Time is India’s biggest strategic weapon – India has it, Pakistan does not. India can compete in the global economy and win. At the end of 2003-04 it will be the 10th largest economy in the world at a GDP of $639B (the Economist). Pakistan with a GDP less than $65B, does not have the resources, human or natural, to compete in the globalized world economy and each and every one of its institutions is either army-owned or completely moth-eaten. Pakistan’s poverty has doubled in the last 15 years and its poor water management has left it near disaster. By agreeing to Pakistan’s time line for bilateral talks in January, we have given up the ability to push out the talks indefinitely and reinforce our terms by say 2006, as the Pakistani state will have further weakened by then.

Reduced our ability to react – Atalji has, in good wisdom started the ball rolling in increasing the goodwill in India for Pakistanis. Nothing wrong with that, except that Musharraf seems to be playing a different game. Saleem Shehzad reported last week that recently, “Musharraf held meetings with jihadi leaders in which he assured them that he supported "jihad in Kashmir" with his "heart and soul". After these assurances, the Jamaatut Dawa (formerly the Lashkar-i-Toiba) was encouraged, with all means and resources, to stage a large gathering in Mureedkey, Punjab, where thousands of jihadis gathered and vowed to liberate Kashmir”. In the last couple of days, Eid celebrations in Pakistan were marked with frenzied crowds in lakhs, declaring jihad on India. Traders who are drooling over getting access to our markets are busy raising money for Masood Azhar and JeM. Hours after the truce went into effect, Pakiustanis attacked a school in Kashmir with grenades – a school??

The problem with one-sided emotions is that it provides Pakistan space to carry out further attacks on Indians, with the full knowledge that the Indian people will not support any retaliatory action on our perceived Pakistani-friends. Hence, the country is no longer ready to take even minimal defensive retaliatory action to protect the lives of its citizens – the barrier for such action has been raised, but major compromises on our security have become easier.

Finally, we’re sending the wrong message – the message being sent to countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh is that "if you make a big enough threat against India, especially if it is well-timed - India can be brought to the negotiation table even on strategic issues". That’s opening up the way for increased ULFA attacks in the North East, when Bangladesh wants more water from India.

Hypothesis 6: Pakistan has made a shift in policy and strategy In ways that are not quite apparent- Pakistan has been slowly shifting and changing its Kashmir policy. The main ingredients of which are:

Look for alternate infiltration routes:
Israeli equipment and Indian defense effectiveness at the border, has increased the number of jihadi terrorists killed during infiltration. Moving infiltration routes to Gujarat and Bangladesh is one approach that is being used. The other is to use India’s willingness in extending the railway links with Pakistan – why choose to infiltrate illegally at the cost of jihadi lives, when the same people can be sent legally into India, through increased rail links?
Move to destabilize India at other places
The Pioneer recently reported on the consolidation within Bangladesh based terrorist groups, brought about by Pakistani terrorist groups controlled by ISI. Saleem Shehzad has reported on infiltrations into Gujarat. Nepali terrorists have been caught in Gujarat. The aim is to strike in western India and the North East. Most such attacks cannot be linked to Pakistani terrorism, as long as India has riots once in a while. So, just like the 100 detonators found near Nasik and the multiple detonators found in a Gujarat temple recently, expect more attempts to start riots in India. The ULFA attacks against Biharis must be seen in this context.

Seek Indian investments to refurbish its defenses and its economy, without making any concessions
India has already begun investing in Pakistan – Dabur has just invested in a factory there. The Pakistanis are beginning to use the Indian film industry to raise money for projects in Pakistan. The current environment in Pakistan makes it impossible for them to get investments from anybody other than overly-generous India. Expect, most of this money to strengthen Pakistani army and also the terrorist infrastructure.
Reduce visible terrorism in Kashmir, to put pressure on India
By alternatingly threatening nuclear war and then reducing terrorism in Kashmir – Pakistan expects and is getting support from UK/US for its view on Kashmir. There is now a fair amount of support in the US and in the UK to let Pakistan keep its part of Kashmir, while opening negotiations on what India gets to keep. India is expected to give in and support greater autonomy for Kashmir, thus taking an important step in Pakistan’s eventual goal of fragmenting India.
Internally control Kashmir through assassinations, bribes and Islamization: Pakistan has been killing off pro-Indian politicos at the grass-roots level. In the last few years, as many as 560 political activists have been killed in J&K. Even legitimate parties within J&K now are hesitant to take any steps that would be considered antithetical to Pakistan’s long term goals in J&K. The same applies to Kashmiri journalists. Today protests explode on the rare occasions that the army operations kill a civilian, but the same never happens when children are regularly killed by Pakistani braves. The steady Islamization of J&K with the construction of hundreds of new mosques and indoctrination by Pakistani style mullahs is another factor that has made Pakistan’s hold on Indian Kashmir much greater.

So, yes there is a definite shift in policy, but in ways that most Indians did not expect. We're talking about a different kind of terrorism than that in Kashmir - here, terrorists will mainly train, indoctrinate, provide weapons or cause riots within fairly unguarded cities (using local perpetrators for help in many cases)- as opposed to directly confronting Indian soldiers. The shift in Pakistan’s policy is to move away from an open proxy war to terrorist attacks only, with much higher degree of deniability.

The last word

In general, I believe that the PMO and MEA have done an excellent job on international diplomacy issues, but I think that in the case of terrorism against India from our immediate neighbors, we have persistently been too clever by a half. We’ve persistently been heavy on the carrots, with hardly any stick. We’ve consistently analysed and re-analysed the question – “what is the price of taking action?” and completely ignored, the flip-side of the same question “what is the price of inaction?”.

No! it is a fallacy to think that BJP is talking about giving up territory in Kashmir – that’s making things far too black and white. Erecting bigger walls between India and Kashmir thru increased autonomy, blasé attitudes towards the killing of 6 pro-India Kashmir politicians in as many weeks, even as the slow Pakistanization of Kashmir through Pakistan-inspired religious teachers continues, is diminishing Indian strategic hold in Kashmir.

Why am I being pessimistic? I’m really not. On the contrary, I’m strongly suggesting that we Indians watch out for strategic mistakes that our politicians tend to make– lest our children and grand-children have to pay for it 50 or 100 years from now. Our history with replete with well meaning leaders giving up strategic advantages – remember Coco island, Kashmir, Indus Water Treaty, seat on the UNSC, …- you get my point. Remember:
“In November 1947, the valiant counter-attack by the Indian Army in Mirpur and Muzaffarabad against Pakistan-sponsored tribal attacks was halted by his (Nehru’s) order. Brigadier LP Sen called it the most unpatriotic order received in his life. In 1948, Nehru took the Kashmir issue to the UN and got it enmeshed in international power politics”.

We and our children are still paying for that strategic mistake.
Let’s hope, we’re not blinking at the wrong time.