India, Pak nuke secrecy deters US aid to security Wednesday, March 16 2005 11:01 Hrs (IST) - World Time -
Washington:
Indian and Pakistani secrecy about their nuclear weapons and installations are an obstacle to US aid to ensure their security, according to an expert report submitted to the US Congress.
"Descriptions of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programmes are incomplete and their accuracy is not reliable," says Congressional Research Service report to the Congress, prepared by Sharon Squassoni, Specialist in its National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Division.
A significant concern is whether US assistance, if it is targeted at making nuclear weapons more secure from unauthorized use, would improve Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon capabilities, Squassoni says.
Permissive action links (PALs), which were developed by the US in the 1960s, were designed so that unauthorised users would not be able to produce a nuclear yield from the weapon. As one observer has remarked, however, another unintended consequence is that weapons with PALs on them are more deployable. One of the goals of US non-proliferation policy presently is to keep India and Pakistan from deploying their weapons.
Another constraint in the current level of cooperation between the US and India and Pakistan. Although Pakistan has been cooperating closely with the US in the war on terrorism, the US has been pushing for both nations to give up their nuclear programmes for almost thirty years.
Following Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq, some in Pakistan apparently are wondering whether Pakistan could be the next target of US counter-proliferation efforts, says Squassoni.
On the other hand, the Bush Administration did not impose sanctions on Pakistan for aiding North Korea's clandestine uranium enrichment programme, and has not pressed the Pakistan Government for direct access to A Q Khan, both of which could be interpreted by Pakistan as reluctance by the Bush Administration to upset relations.
In addition, the designation of Pakistan in 2004 as a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally has probably also bolstered Pakistan's confidence in the US.
On the whole, despite some progress in Kashmir, there are still few indications that India or Pakistan would want to enhance transparency to build confidence, either with each other or with the US. Between the two states, there appears to be more interest in threat enhancement than threat reduction.
In addition, Pakistan's reliance on foreign procurement sources could also make transparency measures difficult. A culture of secrecy for India and Pakistan may be difficult to transcend. On the other hand, professional pride in their accomplishments may provide some leverage for scientists' or military officials' cooperation.
Policy options would cover site security, material security, nuclear weapons security and personnel security. However, measures to ensure that command and control systems work, while helping to ensure no unauthorized use, could possibly enhance operational capabilities. The types of measures for personnel security that could be implemented absent Pakistani and Indian disarmament are limited, says Squassoni.