Sunday, May 15 2005 12:27 Hrs (IST) - World Time -

New Delhi: Was the Agra Summit held under US pressure overruling an advice from the External Affairs Ministry and the National Security Advisory Board?

An indication to this regard has been given by late National Security Adviser J N Dixit in his book "Indian Foreign Service: History and Challenge", released recently by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The book says the US had "successfully restrained" India from taking "any effective action" against Pakistan after the terror attack on Parliament in December 2001 preceded by the strike on Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly.

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf "was invited to India by the Government despite a clear advice given against such a visit by senior members of the Foreign Service in the Ministry of External Affairs as well as by the National Security Advisory Board of the Government," it says.

Citing information provided by "colleagues" in Foreign Service at that time, the author says then External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh had "ignored" the Ministry's advice "because he was persuaded by arguments of the US Government to hold such a Summit meeting".

The career-diplomat, who passed away in January, notes the Summit ended in a "fiasco primarily because the Government of India did not have a structured agenda or any clear idea of what was hoped to be achieved at this Summit."

Dixit faulted the Vajpayee Government on giving unconditional support to the US in its campaign against international terrorism ignoring an advice to the contrary from the External Affairs Ministry, saying it had affected India's "interests negatively".

The support should have been subject to the US giving certain assurances about countering Pakistan-sponsored terrorism against India, the book says.

It says the Foreign Service felt the US would focus on its own specific concerns and interests and that its approach would not automatically cover Indian concerns and anxieties about Pak-sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India.

"The advice from the Ministry of External Affairs and most of the Indian Missions abroad on the subject was that while India should generally support the US campaign against international terrorism, the support should not be unconditional," Dixit says. "The advice was not completely accepted at the political level. India extended unconditional and total support to the US on the issue of terrorism without any quid pro quo," he says.

"The realities which emerged by December 2001 were that the US successfully restrained India against taking any effective action against Pakistan despite Pak-sponsored terrorist attacks on Indian Parliament in December 2001 and the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly," the book says.

The Foreign Service had the "general feeling that its valid professional advice was not accepted because of extraneous political reasons which resulted in India's interests being affected negatively."