UK had doubts on US ability to handle post-war Iraq Sunday, June 12 2005 20:11 Hrs (IST) - World Time -
Washington:
Britain had doubts even before the Iraq war about whether Washington had an adequate plan for the post-war period, according to documents prepared eight months ahead of the US-led invasion to oust Saddam Hussein's regime.
The 'Downing Street memo' prepared before the March 2003 invasion by senior British officials for Prime Minister Tony Blair also says that "intelligence and facts were being fixed around policy" to suit the US argument that Saddam possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and terror links.
The July 2002 memo, which will be discussed at a Congressional hearing later this week, was leaked in Britain and further extracts published by The Washington Post today (Jun 12, 2005).
According to the document, US military planning for action against Iraq "is proceeding apace" but "little thought" had been given to "the aftermath and how to shape it."
The British officials, who had returned from Washington, said that President George W Bush and his aides believed war was inevitable and were determined to use intelligence about Saddam's alleged WMDs and his alleged relations with terrorists to justify invasion of Iraq.
"Intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy," the memo stated bluntly.
In a section titled "Benefits/Risks," the July 21, memo states: "Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks."
Noting that, "We need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective," the memo's authors pointed out: "A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise."
"As already made clear, the U.S. military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden," it adds.
The memo and other internal British Government documents were originally obtained by London's Sunday Times, but excerpts were made available to the Post, which said British sources have confirmed the authenticity of the material on condition of anonymity.
The Pentagon, it is now known, ignored extensive State Department studies on how to achieve stability after an invasion.
Bush Administration officials have also acknowledged that they made a mistake in dismantling the Iraqi army and cancelling pensions to its veteran officers, which many say hindered security, enhanced anti-U.S. feeling and aided what would later become a violent insurgency which is still continuing, the daily said.
In a testimony before a House subcommittee, the then-Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul D Wolfowitz, now World Bank president and one of the chief architects of the invasion, had said the containment of Saddam Hussein in the previous 12 years had cost "slightly over $30 billion," adding, "I can't imagine anyone here wanting to spend another $30 billion to be there for another 12 years."
He proved woefully wrong. As of May, the Congressional Research Service estimates that Congress has approved $208 billion for the war in Iraq and occupation since 2003, said the Post.