Saturday, August 13 2005 10:08 Hrs (IST) - World Time -

Washington: The US-India agreement on civilian nuclear energy cooperation will contravene the control guidelines laid down by the nuclear suppliers group,according to a study prepared for the US Congress.

Referring to the agreement of July 18 between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W Bush, The Congressional Research Service (CRS) report said if implemented, the cooperation between US and India for civilian nuclear energy 'would dramatically shift U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice towards India.'

"Such cooperation would also contravene multilateral support control guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which was formed in response to India's proliferation," claimed the report authored by Sharon Squassoni, Specialist in National Defence.

At a time when US has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws and implementation and for tighter multilateral controls, US nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating an NSG exemption.

"Although some states may agree that it is necessary to create a new paradigm for India, others may believe that this agreement undercuts the basic bargain of Non Proliferation Treaty- -peaceful nuclear cooperation in exchange for forgoing nuclear weapons," Squassoni said.

"Observers note that US-India cooperation could have wide-ranging implications for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and could prompt other suppliers,like China, to justify their supplying other non-nuclear- weapon states (as defined by NPT), like Pakistan."

The report said that the agreement is undoubtedly welcome

The report said though the steps India has agreed to take under the Bush-Manmohan Singh agreement are 'undoubtedly welcome', 'some (unnamed) observers believe they are insufficient.'

Separating civilian and military facilities, placing civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, and applying an additional protocol are all positive steps, but place India squarely in the company of nuclear weapon states.

"There are no measures in this global partnership to restrain India's nuclear weapons programme. India has a self-imposed nuclear test moratorium but continues to produce fissile material for its nuclear weapon programme, despite support for the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT). Few observers are sanguine that FMCT negotiations can precede quickly in the Conference on Disarmament even if negotiations do not cover verification, as the Bush Administration prefers," Sqassoni said in the report.

From a technical verification perspective, the report contends, 'the existence of India's nuclear weapons programme gates potential nonproliferation assurances that nuclear safeguards on civil facilities might provide.'

"A significant question is how India, in the absence of full-scope safeguards (i.e. IAEA safeguards on every nuclear establishment, military and civil), can provide adequate confidence that US peaceful nuclear technology will not be diverted to nuclear weapons purposes."

But the report concedes that unlike Pakistan, there is little evidence to suggest that India has transferred sensitive nuclear technologies to other non-nuclear weapon states.

Therefore, India's promise to refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them, as well as its promise to adhere to NSG guidelines, may be formalities.