US House panel cautions against nuclear arms race Monday, July 24 2006 10:05 Hrs (IST) - World Time -
Washington:
With the India-US nuclear deal coming up for Congressional approval this week, a key panel has asked the Bush administration to ensure that it does not help the Indian nuclear weapons programme in any way or contribute to a nuclear arms race in South Asia.
"Peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can serve multiple US foreign policy and national security objectives," the House of Representatives' Committee on International Relations said in a report commending the enabling legislation.
But it must be approached in a manner that minimizes potential risks to the non-proliferation regime, the panel headed by Republican Henry Hyde said in its report on the draft bill approved by it by an overwhelming 37-5 majority last month.
Giving its rationale for its draft, the panel said one of important considerations was the need to ensure that US cooperation does not assist the Indian nuclear weapons programme, directly or indirectly, in order to avoid contributing to a nuclear arms race in South Asia and because of US obligations under the NPT.
The bill has been committed to the Committee of the Whole House which is scheduled to meet on Tuesday to set out the particulars of debate on the India nuclear bill how much time will be allowed for debate, whether amendments can be offered, and other such matters.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Republican chairman, Richard Lugar, has introduced a somewhat different version of the legislation as approved by his panel by an equally wide 16-2 vote. But no date has been set as yet for debate in the upper house.
Since the two bills take different approaches to the deal, the legislation will have to go after passage to a Conference Committee to reconcile their differences as a bill cannot become a law of the land until it has been approved in identical form by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Among its other most important considerations, the House panel were ensuring that Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines and consensus decision-making are upheld and that a US nuclear cooperation agreement and subsequent US nuclear exports are consistent with the decisions, policies and guidelines of the NSG.
Thus the House draft bill requires, as a condition for the president to exercise his waiver authority, that the NSG agree by consensus to an exception specifically for India to its guidelines and that no US exports may be transferred to India that do not comport with NSG guidelines and decisions.
As in the administration's own proposed legislation, the draft approved by the panel requires the president to determine that India is upholding its July 18, 2005, commitments as a prerequisite for using his waiver authority.
But the Committee also believes that India's continued implementation of those commitments is vital to the health of their bilateral relationship. Therefore, the bill contains reporting requirements and a provision that calls for termination of exports in the event of violations of certain commitments, it said.
Lastly, the bill seeks to uphold existing statutory Congressional oversight of US nuclear cooperation and exports. At a time when the world appears to be considering nuclear energy as a viable and desirable alternative to carbon-based energy sources, oversight of its expansion is crucial, the panel said.
The administration's own proposal sought to replace the procedure in existing statute for approving agreements that did not meet all the statutory requirements--a joint resolution of approval with routine consideration for agreements that do meet the requirements.
The Committee rejected this approach in favour of retaining existing Congressional prerogatives in the Atomic Energy Act, it said, outlining the purpose of the enabling legislation as drafted by it.
Once adopted, the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006 would exempt a future peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India from current statutory restrictions in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, that would otherwise not permit the export of nuclear items and materials to India.
Such restrictions normally apply on such agreements with states other than `Nuclear Weapon States' such as the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia as recognized by the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT that do not have comprehensive international nuclear safeguards, that have ongoing nuclear weapons programmes, or that have tested nuclear weapons since 1978.
A peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India would be inconsistent with these restrictions, the panel noted. The draft bill thus requires that, in order to waive the requirements in the AEA, the President must certify that India has fulfilled the commitments it undertook on July 18, 2005, in the US-India Joint Statement to (among other activities) expand peaceful nuclear trade.
These commitments included providing a credible plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, concluding a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), continuing its moratorium on nuclear tests, and working actively with the United States to prevent the spread of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technology to other countries, among other measures.
In addition, the president must certify that the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has agreed by consensus to modify its guidelines to permit civil nuclear trade with India, which would otherwise be precluded for its 45 member-states.
Once the president certifies that these conditions have been met, he may exercise the waiver authorities provided in the bill and present the negotiated agreement to Congress for approval. In order for US-India nuclear cooperation to begin, however, the negotiated agreement must be approved by a subsequent joint resolution adopted by both the House and Senate.
The text of the safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency must also be submitted to inform Congressional review of the US-India agreement, which will rely upon the IAEA safeguards to alert the US to any diversion of US-provided nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes.
Finally, the draft bill provides for enhanced Congressional oversight of nuclear cooperation with India by requiring annual reports on US non-proliferation policy in South Asia and the implementation of the US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.