Thursday, July 27 2006 10:32 Hrs (IST) - World Time -

Washington: The landmark legislation passed by the US House of Representatives to approve the India-US nuclear deal in principle is seen as a balancing act to win bipartisan support for a measure that is generally seen as the beginning of a new relationship between the world's two largest democracies.

The House Committee on International Relations acknowledged in its report to the House that both Republican and Democrat legislators agreed that the India nuclear deal can serve multiple US foreign policy and national security objectives.

But critics were also concerned about the deal setting a precedent, starting a new arms race in South Asia or indirectly aiding India's weapons programme. Above all, supporters and opponents alike were upset over what was seen as a dilution of Congress' oversight authority.

Thus the House committee favoured a two-vote process of approval. The first clearing the deal in principle gives the Bush administration authority to negotiate a formal '123' agreement so named after the relevant section of the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954.

And to accommodate the critics and yet avoid a return to the negotiating table, a litany of expectations and exhortations, including some unpalatable references to Iran, were added in two sections on 'Sense of Congress' and a 'Statement of Policy' that are not binding on either side.

The bill gives the president fresh authority to waive a cut off in nuclear exports because of former president Bill Clinton's determination that India had tested a nuclear explosive device in 1998, while keeping in place the requirement to cut off exports, should India test in the future.

The binding provisions require India to give the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a credible plan to separate civilian and military nuclear programmes and materials, and reach an agreement with the IAEA to permanently abide by its standards.

It also requires the president to certify to Congress that India is working for the early conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, tightening laws regarding security of nuclear materials and technology, and adhering to requirements of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which must agree by consensus to an exception for India to its guidelines.

The 'Sense of Congress' presents a set of principles as a guide for possible future civil nuclear cooperation with any country that has never been a signatory to the NPT, but they are so tailored that only India fits the bill.

The suggested criteria include demonstrating responsible behaviour with respect to the non-proliferation of WMD technology and the means to deliver these weapons; the country has a functioning and uninterrupted democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is congruent with that of the US, and is working with the US in key foreign policy initiatives related to non-proliferation.

Similarly, the Statements of Policy sets forth two sets of policies of the US: those general in nature and those specific to South Asia.

The first require US to act to secure agreement among NSG members that violations by one country of an agreement with any NSG member result in joint action by all, including the termination of all nuclear exports.

In respect to South Asia, the policy requires US to achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China at the earliest possible date and achieve the conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the US and India become parties.

It also seeks to secure India's full participation in US efforts to dissuade, isolate, sanction, and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire WMDs, including a nuclear weapons capability and the means to deliver these besides seeking to halt the increase of nuclear weapons arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.

In an apparent explanation of these expectations, the House committee said in its report that while India undoubtedly will make its own judgments regarding its national security interests, the international community should try to ensure that peaceful civil cooperation with India does not result in an increase in its nuclear arsenal.

But above all, the House appeared most concerned about its own diminished role. The committee had thus decided to reject the administration's proposed method of Congressional consideration of a negotiated agreement as intending to effectively remove Congress from any substantive role.

Given the unique and controversial nature of the proposed civil nuclear cooperation agreement and the fact that Congress was not consulted regarding the negotiations between the administration and the Indian government relating to the original announcement of their intention to negotiate such an agreement, Congressional scrutiny and approval was deemed essential to protect US interests, it said.

Direct Congressional involvement, especcially the requirement for it approval, is also necessary to ensure that the pledges and assurances made by the administration and the Indian government are actually met and not rendered irrelevant through lack of action or discontinuation of interest, the report asserted.