To what extent is the present Indo-China border problem, a result of India's foreign policy in the 1950's?

The Indo-China border problem is entirely the result of the foreign policy that Nehru followed towards China, in the early fifties.

Till October 1950, India's neighbor was Tibet 'verging independence', as Nehru himself wrote in a secret note in November 1950. When, for the sake of an illusory friendship with China, India decided to accept China's invasion of Tibet as a fait accompli, she neglected not only Tibet's interests, but also her own. This was despite the repeated warnings of Sardar Patel, who unfortunately passed away in December 1950.

With Tibet gone, the game took a different turn. To take the example of the McMahon Line, which was the accepted border between Tibet and India since the 1914 Simla Convention. Soon after the Chinese established themselves in Tibet, they declared, "We do not recognize agreements signed by imperialists (British India)". Therefore they stopped recognizing the McMahon Line and it was the beginning of their claim on Indian Territory.

An independent and friendly Tibet was the greatest protection for India. When this buffer disappeared India got confronted with a totally new problem. This is the case even in the western sector (Ladhak). Most of today's problems with China and the 1962 Indo-China war could have been avoided. The lesson is that in the end appeasement never pays.

  Two events shook Asia in the1950's. One was China's intervention in the Korean War and the other was the Chinese invasion of Tibet. What could be the reasons for Nehru and his associates to focus on the Korean situation rather than Chinese occupation of Tibet?

Many reasons motivated Nehru when he decided to let Tibet down. I must point out at the outset that he acted against his own principle of supporting small Asian and African countries seeking independence from the colonial empires.

However, in the case of Tibet, he let the neo-colonialist China devour a small nation state, without blinking an eye. There were many motivations for him to do so.

One, he sincerely believed that a friendship between India and China was important for Asia and the world.

Two, ideologically, he was certainly leaning more towards socialism and communism than the American or Western type of society.

Three, he believed that the Asian nations who had gone through a similar experience under colonial powers should share a common future.

Four, he did not believe in confrontation and war and thought that all problems could be solved through negotiations. However, this was not the case with China, which believed that power came from the barrel of a gun. He also had the ambition of playing the role of a 'neutral' mediator in the world.

The Korean War and the Chinese intervention there, was a perfect platform for him to climb onto the world stage as a referee between the two blocks (communist and capitalist). The Korean conflict began at the same time as the invasion of Tibet. Nehru could not simultaneously play a neutral role in Korea while antagonizing the Chinese in Tibet.

Mao, one of the greatest strategists of the 20th century foresaw perfectly Nehru's dilemma. In invading Tibet in 1950, Mao was playing safe.

  In your book, The Fate of Tibet: When big insects eat small insects, you have come with a lot of evidence, which incriminates Nehru and his policies. What were your sources and how did you manage to secure them?

I have mainly used Nehru's own words published in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru as well as some documents in the British and American archives. The main problem in India is that all documents pertaining to Tibet are still classified. Although like anywhere else in the world there is a rule stating that after 30 years, all documents should come into the public domain, in India, it is not implemented, especially in the case of issues related with Tibet and Kashmir.

However, the fact that the British left India in 1947, taking with them all the files of the Indian government up to 1947, proved to be a good fortune for the historians. Today, the public can access information pertaining to this period in the India Office Records, located in London. The irony is that those very documents cannot be viewed in India.

Another problem is that the so-called Nehru Papers, most of them pertaining to the official correspondence of Nehru, 'belong' to the Nehru family and the permission of Mrs. Sonia Gandhi has to be obtained to access them. This means that for all practical purposes, they are still 'classified'. The most glaring case in India is the Henderson Brooks Report of the 1962 Indo-China War. It has remained a secret document after nearly 40 years, mainly because it indicts Nehru.

For me, these issues are very serious, because they challenge the whole notion of Democracy. But nobody seems to bother about it. It is a great pity that India does not have institutions like the National Security Archives in the United States, which is a private organization giving citizens the right to access information. Though Public Citizen Litigation Groups now exist in India in the field of environmental studies and social work, there is no such thing in the domain of history.

  Is China helping Pakistan to spread militancy in the Kashmir Valley? If so, to what extent and what are the evidence we have for that?

I do not think that China is directly helping militancy in the Valley because if they would do so, they could catch the same disease in their province of Sinkiang. In fact, there is a fear amongst the Chinese leadership that if the Islamic Jihad establishes itself in Kashmir, the next target of the militants would be the Muslim Ugyurs of Sinkiang.

I believe that is the reason why Nawaz Sherif had to shorten his visit to China at the height of the Kargil conflict in May 1999. It was pointed out to him that China could not accept the principle of Jihad. However, China is supporting Pakistan in many other ways, particularly in their nuclear program as well as in procuring armament. So, China's involvement in Kashmir is restricted to its military support to Pakistan.

During the recent visit of President Musharraf to China, the spokesperson of the Chinese government daily repeated that the friendship between China and Pakistan was an old and 'all-weather' friendship. For the past fifty years it has been more a friendship based on the shared dislike for India, rather than common perspectives and affinity. Also China would certainly be happy if Pakistan could take over the Siachen Glacier.

Their border with Pakistan would then be extended to the Karakoram pass, providing a safer protection for the Tibet-Sinkiang highway. It would also increase the pressure on Ladakh. So China has a lot to benefit from a friendship with Pakistan.

  Why are the west, the media and the Indian Government downplaying China's involvement in the Kashmir crisis?

China, which occupies a large chunk of Kashmir in the Aksai Chin part of Ladakh, is interested in a status quo. What China has done for the past 50 years is to equate the situation in Kashmir with the situation in Tibet. They have repeatedly told Indian leaders, "If you support the Dalai Lama and his people, we shall support the Kashmiris."

In the past, the Indian leaders have always fallen for this Chinese argument and have adopted a policy of appeasement toward China, because it is better to tackle one enemy, which is smaller than to tackle two. However I would like to point out that the two situations are totally different, Tibet was an independent nation (it was formally declared in 1912 by the previous Dalai lama) when the Chinese liberation army entered Tibet.

Kashmir has been part of India for two thousand years. Another huge difference is that while India is at the receiving end of an ethnic cleansing in Kashmir, in Tibet it is the Chinese government which resorts to demographic aggression by bringing in, 'vast seas of Chinese colons" as the Dalai Lama once put it.

Another theory is that India cannot have two enemies at the same time and Pakistan has traditionally been the No. 1 enemy, therefore China should be appeased. Also, the West knows very little about the Kashmiri crisis and their media is not even interested to know. One should also not forget that the Kashmiri problem is a creation of the West (particularly the British), who arbitrarily divided the subcontinent on a communal line and they are never proud to show their results of their own mess-ups.

Another problem is that for the western public, everything has to be chewed upon and digested before being offered to the public. This results in over-simplification of very complicated issues.

  It is said that the part of the Indian territory of Ladakh, called Aksai-Chin, which China has illegally occupied, is a barren wasteland. Of what possible use is it for the Chinese?

In 1959, Nehru told the Lok Sabha that 'not a blade of grass' was growing on the Aksai Chin, therefore why all this fuss 'for a few rocks'. Aksai Chin is one of the saddest parts of India's post-independence history. As soon as the so-called Chinese Liberation Army reached Central Tibet in 1951-52, they began to build roads.

Their purpose was not to 'liberate' Tibet, but to put in place strategic communication links "to defend their western borders" (against India). The Tibet-Sinkiang Highway cutting through the Indian Territory (Aksai Chin) was planned at that time. The construction started soon after and it was inaugurated in 1957. Nehru's government 'came to know' about it in 1958 when an Indian patrol was caught by the Chinese in this area.

It was kept secret for one more year and the scam exploded in the Lok Sabha in 1959. But it was already too late. This barren land, which is part of Ladakh since the 10th century, is of great strategic importance to the Chinese because it links Tibet to Kashgar in Sinkiang.

This is perhaps the most strategic road for Beijing. The Nehru government should have had the common sense and foresight to know about this, as it had been the main link between Western Tibet, Kashmir and Central Asia.

  In your article Train to Lhasa, you have said that the massive road-building program, which the Chinese undertook in the 1950's and 60's, is being replaced by railroad construction. What does this mean to India's national security?

To have a train reaching Lhasa is of great importance for Beijing. Taking the excuse of developing Tibet, they will bring more and more colons and ultimately 'cleanse' and wipe out the Tibetan identity, like it was done in Inner Mongolia.

It is what I called the 'Second Liberation'. More importantly for India, the rail will make Tibet (and the border with India) closer to the mainland, increasing China's military capacity. One should not forget, that the Chinese have now rail access to the most remote parts of Sinkiang as well as to the south to Burma and the Indochina peninsula. I should mention another security danger for India.

Tibet is the source of most of the great rivers of Asia and the control of these rivers is of great strategic importance. One example is the flood, which occurred in Spring 2000 in Arunachal Pradesh, and the July 2000 flood in the Kinnaur area, which washed away many Indian strategic roads and bridges (especially along the Sutlej in Himachal Pradesh).

There are good reasons to believe that these floods were not natural calamities but human-triggered. Unfortunately, it was hardly reported about in the Indian press. The strategic position of the Tibetan plateau is the most important factor to keep in mind.

  What according to you should be the kind of measures the west and the Indian government employ in order to reduce the Chinese menace?

First of all, I do not think that the West sees a Chinese menace against India. They were shocked when a couple of years ago, George Fernandez pointed out the problem. As for the Indian government, they should support the Dalai Lama's plan to transform the Tibetan plateau into a zone a peace.

In the long run, it is the only solution. It will be of great benefit for China and India to have a buffer zone between them. China has been very unhappy for several decades with the critiques against her Tibet policy.

It will dramatically increase China's prestige if they could find a just and 'human' solution to the Tibetan issue. I believe some Chinese leaders can understand that, but for the time being the hardliners are dominating the scene.

As for India, it is obviously in her interest to have again a friendly and peaceful neighbour. India should initiate negotiations between Beijing and the Dalai Lama who now accepts the principle of a 'genuine autonomy' within the People's Republic of China.

Once Tibet is a demilitarized zone, all the other issues can be easily sorted out. India too should begin the task of informing the public better.

Between 1959-1964, the Ministry of External Affairs published White Papers on China, and for some reason this was discontinued. It is not in India's interests to keep the situation under a veil of secrecy. For example, in the case of Kashmir, the public relations policy of the government has been so bad that there are hardly any foreign correspondents that can understand India's legal contentions. We should not forget that in recent times, the media and the public opinion have played a decisive role in winning or loosing a war over any issue.

Finally, I believe that only an undoing of the division of the Indian subcontinent can bring about a permanent solution to the problem of Kashmir and the Indo-China border dispute.